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Introduction
Studies in communication have s hown that, in the fllm industry. women as directors
obtain less financial support than men. They find themselves in a peculiar situation: the
discrimination they suffer obliges them to innovate. and hence they often find
themselves at the 'avant garde' of cinematographic production. This is s pecifically true
in the area of documentary film-making. To use Carle's words, In film 'the revolution
passes through women' (1990: 101).
Is women's production too innovative to be acknowledged in the dominant discourse?
Or Is it that women's knowledge In that production, 'an improbable mixture of total
sincerity. sof~ aggressiveness and regained emotions' (Carle 1990:101), Is so different
from that of men in position of power in the film industry that the latter cannot
understand it? Whatever the answer to these questions, women film -makers· production
is rarely vested with the authority that would facilitate the development of a career. Even
in the mid 1990s. this lack of recognition is still remarkable.
This paper is an exploratory investigation of women's knowledge in the film industry.
As· such, its purpose is rather to raise rarely asked questions about the place of women

I. In my paper. I use
indlscrlm1nately the words
directors and fllmmakers for
the same occupation
although. In sooe studies.
the noUon of Olmmakcrs
may have a
wid er

conn otoUon than film
directors. My understanding
of those two notions here, Is
that suggested by the
National Film Board In

Canada. namely ·a person
who generates Ideas fo r
films and oth er types of
audlovlsual mat.ertal. directs
their production ru~d helps
to promote them (In
Fou ndation for Toronto
Women In FUm and VIdeo
1991: 157)',

in the industry than it is to answer them. My exploration of the issue is enlightened by a
discussion of Foucault's (1972, 1980) notion of knowledge in relation to power, of Code's
(1991) analysis of knowledge in relation to gender. and by a review of some of the issues
in the debate over women. culture and communication. I turn finally to an empirical
examination of the case of women as film directors. 1 through a review of secondary
sources such as books written on the issue and art critiques In newspapers. This
examination is by no means thorough, but should rather be seen as a point of departure
for deeper and more extensive emplrtcal studies on this issue.

What knowledge?
According to Foucault (1972). there is knowledge when 'a group oi elements lis}
formed in a regular manner by a discursive practice'. These elements must be related in
some ways and linked through some statements in which some of them will be given
more importance than others. either to stress a particular point or b ecause some
concepts are closer to one's position than others. Knowledge. then. exists as a 'field of
coordination. subordination of statements In which concepts appear. and are defined,
applied and transformed'. It Is 'the space in which one s ubject may take up a position'
and explain the elements used In one's discourse. However. knowledge constituted by
the coordination of such elements and concepts may or may not acquire a scientific
status' (1972: 182-3).
In The Archaeology of Knowledge (1992), Foucault distinguishes between two types of
knowledge: 'connalssance' and 'savoir'. 'Connalssance' is identified as scientific
knowledge. subjected to specific rules determined by a particular discipline or field.
'Savolr' is not necessarily subj ected to formal rules, but represents the necessary
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conditions, in a particular period. for an element or an enunciation to beco;ne
'connaissance'. It is acquired either In formal Institutions (schools. church, etc.) or more
spontaneously in daily experiences. It may be constituted in the form of a gen eral
statement or In more precise forms of expertise. In this paper, I discuss knowledge In
the sense of 'savoir'. So the meaning of know\edge here rests on concepts associated
wilh social practices rather than with science. and with women's practices in the
domain of communication and culture.
As such. I do not consider knowledge as a fixed concept of the dominant scientific
discourse, defined once and for all, but as something that fluctuates. that undergoes
'displacements and transformations' in history. to use Foucault's words. Knowledge.
then, consists of a group of concepts which may be understood differently according to
lhe perspective (macroscopic vis-a-vis microscopic) from which one looks at them, or to
the development of a particular field or discipline which may Influence the way they are
connected and organized into a bJerarchy. In other words, the historical perspective
adopted to link concepts and elements influences the way in which a society is
conceptualized and reconceptualized. History involves discontinuities not always
acknowledged (and sometimes deliberately omitted for different reasons) by historians or
practitioners. The effect is the production of partial knowledge which may h elp to
promote the empowerment of some social groups to the detriment of others. As such.
knowledge is related to power.

. Knowledge and power
Like Foucault, I believe 'that power Is neither given. nor exchanged. nor recovered,
but rather exercised. and that it only exists in action' (1980:89). Thereby, lhe questions
arising are: What sort of 'exercise' does power involve? Through what mechanisms is il
exercised? To study mechanisms of power and their relation to knowledge, Foucault
suggests that we look at the way lhat knowledge leads to power and that power
Influences knowledge. since the exercise of power itself causes the emergence of new
objects of knowledge and the accumulation of bodies of In formation which. In tum, may
change the way power is exercised.
How do mechanisms of power come to be accepted or rejected? Part of the reason for
their acceptance is that they are rarely In the form of crude coercion and repression but
rather are parts and effects of social, political and cultural conditions acting as a force
which 'traverses and produces things . ... Induces pleasure, forms of knowledge. produces
discourse'. As Foucault points out. power ·needs to be considered as a productive
network which runs through the whole social body. much more than as a n egative
Instance whose function is repression' (1980:119). It Is not to be 'identified with an
Individual who possesses and exercises it by right'. but rather as 'a machinery that no
one owns' (1980: 156).
Mechanisms of power often take the form of types of knowledge imposed on a group
of people by another. The imposition of a certain type of knowledge entails the omission
of others. Why are some types of knowledge dismissed while others are seen as universal
truth? Knowers have Identities and characteristics that have emerged from the relations
of power wh ich have influenced their conditions of life and work. Different types of
knowledge are p roduced and hierarchized within these conditions. Hence, such
characteristics as social class, culture. race. age and gender influence the specificity of
the politics of truth in bourgeois society. Groups of knowers living within specific social
conditions establish a system of rules orienting the production, distribution and
circulation of different types of knowledge which they may find more productive than
others. These groups .are part of the system s of power which produce and main tain
'lruth' and which are reproduced by it. Thus, there is an administration of knowledge as
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truth, a politics of knowledge and relations of power created by knowledge. If these are
studied in terms of location, implantation. displacement and transposition, they may
unveil the mechanisms through which knowledge functions as a form of power and
through which various types of knowledge are subjugated to silence and disqualification
by dominant knowers.
Indeed, different types of knowledge have been disqualified in our society. 'Naive'
knowledge, 'subjective' knowledge, 'pop1,.llar' knowledge have been located below what is
considered as objective, scientific, universal knowledge in the social hierarchy. In other
words. 'non-scientific' ways of knowing have been often dismissed to give place to the
'unlven~al truth' of science, the truth of those in positions of power. It is among the
former ways of knowing that women's knowledge Is generally located. To counter this
partial understanding of knowledge, we must avoid 'reduc(ingl others to silence. by
claiming that what they say Is worthless' (1972:17].

Gendered knowledge
In dominant discourse, It is a self-evident principle that truth and knowledge. once
discerned and established, acquire the status of objective. a historical, neutral and
universal, a status recognized by the 'experts'. This principle of objectivity and
universality is at the basis of the significance of scientific knowledge and professional
expertise. It is used to establish the credibility and authority of different types of
knowledge. Credibility and authority are at the core of the relationship between power
and knowledge; they are central lo the place given to different types of knowledge in the
social hierarchy of knowledge. Yet. Code asserts that pure objectivity is an impossible
aim in scientific research, and the subjectivity and the specificities of the knower 'can
and must be accorded central epistemological significance' (1991: 4). This is all lhe more
important in feminist research, since women as social knowers are disqualified in the
ful'lest sense of that term. because female knowledge is considered to be subjective and
particular. This disqualification. however, operates differently according to a woman's
class. race. age and culture. and Is not a lways or wholly conscious. It is part of the
'machinery' of power and takes the form of a 'network of sociopolitical relationships and
intellectual assumptions (which) creates an Invisible system of acceptance and rejection,
discourse and silence. ascendancy and subjugation ' (1991: 25) within and around
various fields of intellectual and cultural activities.
This exclusion of women as knowers has led, according to Code (1991). to the
creation of feminist approaches which attempt to rehabiUlate 'non-scientific' ways of
knowing. One is based on the Idea that women should create their own models of
scientific knowledge because there is a distinctive feminist way of knowing which has
not been acknowledged by dominant theories. The other approach suggt::sl:s that women
should u se the already existing models of science and adjust them to their own ways of
knowing, showing their strengths and their shortcomings. Both approaches present
male power as a unified hegemony and female repression as a single, unique position.
This has the effect of giving an essential characteristic to the concepts of women and
men. and to dismissing the fact that masculinity and femininity vary according to class.
race. age, culture, etc. This way of presenting male power and female repression negates
the specificities of the knowers, the fact that there is an interplay of subjective and
objective factors in the establishment of knowledge. It also encourages the use of such
dichotomies as objective/subjective, male/female, scientific/popular, theory /practice,
reason/emotion, universal/particular, mind/body. abstract/concrete. with the firsl term
of each attributed to men and the other to women . These dichotomies invariably lead to
the creation of a hierarchy of types of knowledge. the very characteristics of dominant
thought. As Code points out, studies of women's oppression ·need to be wary lest they
replicate the very structures they deplore' (1991: 20).
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Types of knowledge
Dichotomies are problematic since they necessarily posit the exclusion of nuanced
positions and fluctuations in knowledge. Yet, in the areas of truth and knowledge, things
are rarely so clearly distinguished. since knowledge is ·a product of an intermingling of
subjective and objective elements' (Code 1991: 30). Though some forms of knowledge are
more purely objective and others more purely subjective. there exist other types of
knowledge along the continuum relating these two more or less extreme forms. But even
in the creation of more purely objective knowledge, 'objectivity requires laking
subjectivity Into account' (1991:31). subjective elements that stem from the knowers'
historical locations. Their locations in history are constitutive of what and how they
can know.
The essentialist approach erases differences among women and men due to elements
linked to the historical and social contexts. Affectivity - personal commitment, Interests
or desires - and creativity are seen as elements of subjectivity influencing the types of
knowledge produced by all women, while all men are seen as having the characteristics
of Man from dominant groups. Yet. men's supremacy and dominance takes various
forms according to the class, race, culture and society to which they belong. For
instance. knowers from the dominant class select and discriminate certain elements of
knowledge on which they impose a specific structure and a certain unity. Knowledge is
then the product of a complex accumulation of political conceptual factors. As women
have been subjugated politically. they have been qualified as ignorant, and their types of
knowledge have been dismissed as worthless.
The objectivity /subjectivity dichotomy creates gender specific experiences, and
emphasizes the fact that the sex of the knower is significant. In patriarchal society, this
dichotomy has legitimated ways of knowing favoured by men In positions of power. while
discredited ways of knowing common to other groups in society. Including women. This
dichotomy is a manifestation of ·a ksex/gender system" that structu res all the other
inequalities of western social arrangements and informs even those areas of life - such
as "objective knowledge" - that might seem to be gender-free' (1991:67). This system,
however. takes divergent forms and adopts different mechanisms according to economic,
racial, religious, class and cultural elements, as knowledge 'is rooted in and shaped by,
specific interests and social arrangements (1991: 68).' Hence, gender politics orient the
definition of what Is to be considered as knowledge, and deny au thoritative status to
women's knowledge. falling to recognize it as knowledge because it grows out of
experiences and practices. frequent contacts with material and sensory objects. As Code
points out. 'for a system that enshrines male su bjectivity in the name of objectivity,
while suppressing the products of female subjectivity with the accusation that they Lack
objectivity. knowledge of these kinds can count only as women's lores (1991: 69).'
Academic researchers sometimes promote these discriminations. Some feminist
studies reinforce these Inequalities by assuming a sharp difference between male and
female knowledges, or by reifying technology. Some of these studies are In culture and
mass communication.

Some feminist studies in culture
Feminist studies in culture generally agree that women's knowledge diverges from
men's, and that its dismissal was primarily due to men's rigid and fixed notion of
knowledge. Yet. women have their own culture. according to Lafontaine (1987). a culture
of individu al resistance lo proscribed norms. which does not necessarily become
collective resistance, but which has some effect on the dominant culture. Individual
interventions gradually bring about a feminine cu lture in the form of 'a set of desires
revealing ... a certain representation of women, a way of life which had been dismissed.
but are now revalued' (Chombart de Lauwe 1987: 54). This type of cultural knowledge
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contrasts with a dominant culture uased on exclusively masculine events (wars, power.
etc.) (Michel 1987).
Still, female knowledge in culture remains difficult to iden tify. says Collin (1987).
because it Is defined in relation to male knowledge, since women have to use a language
created by dominant male groups to communicate. Women's access to knowledge is thus
a form of liberation at the same time as it Is 'a thickening of the veil that separates
women from themselves.' Since women use concepts defined and assessed by men, their
knowledge always reflects a point of vic~w which Is not theirs in a culture which ts not
theirs. Truth increases the untruth of ber point of view' (1987: 108). Collin however
admits that a 'pure' feminine culture cannot and should not exist. To separate it from
masculine culture would be 'to reduce It to a moribund state' (1987: 112). Yet. male
knowledge remains the dominant knowledge. that of power, wbile women's knowledge is
kept in a state of marginality and dependence. What are the social mechanisms allowing
unequal positions to male and female knowledges In culture?
According to Smith (1989). women's situation is only one case among many of
cultural marginalization. Dominant culture is not the making of people generally. but
the product of the dominant classes. Cultural creations, Images. ideas do not emerge
from the spontaneous production of people's various daily cultural experiences, but are
produced by specialists, experts in culture, who have powerful positions in ideological.
cultural institutions and industry. In capitalist society, culture is made for profit, and Is
regulated and controlled to sustain and maintain this economic process. Hence, images
and thoughts communicated to us through media or otherwise. and which we use to
think and talk about ourselves are not only the product of male knowledge, as Collin
points out, but emerge from men in positions of dominance. The institutional structures
sustaining these activities and the means t h ey offer to perform them have been
produced by men for women and not by women (Smith, 1989). Thus, the perspectives,
concern s and interests of one class. one sex, and one race, expressed in patriarchal
culture and presented as natural. obvious and general, dismiss or compartmentalize
other form s of creation. Smith's apparent homogenization of female oppression is
tempered .bY her assertion that it does not originate from a bias against women (or
against working classes or other races). or even from negative stereotypes, but from
'(t)he exclusion of women from participating in creating the culture of the society'. an
exclusion 'largely organiZed by the ordinary social processes of socialization, education,
work and communication' (1989: 10).
This supports Code's assertion that women's exclusion from participating in
dominant cultural and intellectual activities Is due to complex patterns of knowledge
created by Institutions which reinforce and legitimize the network of authority and
expertise maintaining asymmetrical, discriminating social and institutional power
structures. The division of intellectual labour presented as essenUal for the functioning
of bourgeois society maintatns patterns of privilege disempowering women and men.
Women's dlsempowerment by structures of authority crosses the lines of class. race. age
or culture.
The intransigence of the instutionalized structures of p ower I
knowledge ... blocks women's access to the authority they require to
take responsibility ... and to achieve the level of cognitive and moral
autonomy that is crucial to their social empowerment
(1991: 177).
Women find themselves in a position of vulnerabllity since they have to trust men to
evaluate their knowledge. In principle, every way of thinking, creativity and intervention
Is equally open to men and women, but practically. power structures. based on an
essentialist conception of women, deny credibili ty to their cultural projects
and creations.
In such a male oriented social organization of knowledge based on power relations
among women and men, women's creative work is generally devalued. According to the
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novelist Tillie Olsen, when a book provokes an injurious reaction. it is not because of 'its
quality or content, but on the basis of its having been written by a woman, with
consequent misreading, mistreatment' (quoted in Smith 1989: 16). Although Tillie's
position is extreme and reflects the lack of subtlety often associated with the dominant
dis course. the fact is that women are excluqed from the position of dominance in
cultural institutions. ln consequence, their production may not always be granted the
recognition that is deserves in the dominant culture nor be acknowledged by Us experts.
Hence, it has to be presented in marginalized places such as women's film festivals,
women's sections in book stores, women's book exhibitions, etc. in order to be made
public knowledge. Women's exclusion is also part of the communication industry.

Gendered knowledge and communication technologies
In the domain of communication. women's knowledge and cultural creations are
closely related to technologies of communication. Various feminist points of view exist to
explain the relationship between women and technologies. These studies often propose
an explanation which suggests the homogenization of female oppression and blames it
on technological features. Some (e.g. Cockburn, 1986) assert that technology in
bourgeois society is entirely controlled by men. which places women in a position of
subordination and subjection in relation to technological uses. Others (e.g. Rothschild,
1983) suggest that since technology is controlled by men. it necessarily bears male
values, and prizes aggressiveness and anti-humanism. They claim that should women
develop them, they would build lhem on values favouring sensitivity, liberation , etc.
Some (e.g. Stanley 1983) believe that women have historically created technologies but
were not recognized for their work because most of these technologies were in the
domestic sphere. Still others (e.g. Purnis as cited in Rakow, 1983) assert that technology
has a role in the construction of gender because it organizes social relations and
experiences and influences the organisation of space and time (in Rakow, 1988). Finally,
some (e.g. Rakow. 1988) assert that technologies do 'not only describe but ascribe'
women (1988:67). They are gendered because they have been conceptualized by men to
use in specific forms of social relations and practices.

All these positions represent more or less deterministic approaches in which the
technology is given a power which should rather be attributed to social relations. To say.
as Rakow does, that technology ascribes specific uses to women. for example. is to
dismiss the fact that women of different classes have divergent access to a technology.
Bourgeois women may never come in contact with a domestic technology used by
women from the working classes for instance. But, Rakow's article is useful in other
ways - in discussing how technology is related to gendered practices in society -. and
she admits that we know too little about communication technologies to assert whether
they alter or inherit power relations in bourgeois society, and enhance or diminish
women's repression.
My own study on women and communication technologies shows that although these
are not neutral, the relations of power in bourgeois society should be traced to the
developers and users rather than to the technological elements. Private and public
interests involved in the development and use of a technology and related to economic,
political and ideological elements of the social organization within which it is distributed
are the forces orienting access to. and control and use of, a technology. I believe that
discrimination against women in relation to communication technology Is not inscribed
.in the artefact, lhal women's repression is not ascribed in the design of the technology
itself. but in its control by certain social groups, in their level of access and types
ofuse. 2
As well. discrimination against women in the labour process is more likely to be
bound to the relations of power in the organization where a technology is used than to
the technology itself. Nonetheless. this does not mean that the technical features have
41
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no limiting effect. The example of women working In the telecommunication and media
industr1es supports these assumptions. Women's knowledge was not given the same
credit in the privacy of the telephone operating labour process as in the very public work
of radio broadcasters. The reason for such unequal access to these two different
technologies were to be found at different levels of analysis.

3. For more Information
on this particular Issue.

Among them, the private versus public use of women's knowledge was an Important
element. With such a means of communication as the teleph one, where women's
knowledge could only be used privately. the economic aspect had priority. The case of
radio broadcasters was different as It Involved the public use of womens' knowledge on
mass communication technology. The control of educated women talking in public was
problematic. The radio gave them the opportunity to express polltical views s upporting
issues which could contradict the dominant ideology. It might also have invested their
knowledge with an authority until then exclusive to men. So. while male administrators'
concern was mostly economic in the privacy of the telephone operating labour process, it
became more political when related to a mass communication technology. This shows
that the oppression of women's knowledge in mass communication may be linked to
various elements which are not always directly related to the technical elements.3 This
issue Is also multi-faceted In the film industry.

see Martin ( 1989).

The eclipsing of women's knowledge as film directors
The camera hardly appears as a gendered technology. Yet. Rakow asserts that the
camera ascribes men and women In gendered practices, as women are usually
positioned before the camera while men are behind, operating it. No one can deny that
practices Ln photographing are gendered, but l would say that the camera itself has little
to do with it. lf women generally found themselves before the camera, it seems to me
that it is not because th e technology is gendered, but rather because, in bourgeois
society. women are often identified as objects and men as subjects with technical skills.
This kind of sexual discrimination finds Itself in the film industry as well.

4 . Thanks to Sadoul who
always refused to credit
Guy with the fi rst film
direction. Melles was
recognl.zed as the first fUm
dlrcctor for years.

Studies (e.g. Lamartine, 1985; Lejeune. 1989) have shown that. historically. women's
knowledge in the film industry has been. lf not completely dismissed, given little credit,
by historians and critics. In France, where Lumlere invented the technology of filmmaking in 1895, and was the first to shoot short sequences on film. some of the most
prominent historians of cinema (e.g. Georges Sadoul, Jean Mitry) ignored women's film
creations or gave credit for them to their male assistants. Mitry says about the films
made by Alice Guy. who Is now recognized as the frrst film director:·... these minor
comedies whose technique was very rudimentary, could not be compared to Melies'
films.• even the most mediocre' (in Lamartine, 1985: 26). A male objective knower had
readily dismissed female film-making.
1n the past. when historians gave credit to women's work. or were sympathetic to
women directors (Charles Ford), they often adopted sexist attitud es and used a
condescending, reductionlst and paternalistic tone, more ins ulting than gratifying
(Lamartine, 1985. Lejeune. 1989). But then. these historians were partly reproducing what
they found in catalogues listing historical productions of films and their directors. These
catalogues rarely gave credit to wom'!n for the films they directt~d, and when they did.
women were often misidentified by being subsumed under their husband's name or work.
A large part of women's work as fllm directors was then dismissed. Even if the husband
did not organize, or even desire. that eclipsing, Lamartine says, historians, critics and
catalogue makers ensure respect for the male order by failing to acknowledge women's
creations and knowledge (1985: 31). This is particularly important since catalogues and
statistical and scientific reports represent the official knowledge in a domain and. as such ,
are regularly used to just:UY some policies and regulations governing that domain. Clearly,
such documents are often the source of production of partial knowledge.
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Not before the early 1970s were women's creations given proper recognition, when
their contribution was finally established by Francis Lacassin (1972) after thorough
research on women directors. According to Lacassin. French and American writers had
wiped Madame Guy's films out. He and other historians like Nicole-Lise Bernheim
(1976) were among the frrst to give credit to wo.men pioneers in film direction like Alice
Guy and Germaine Dulac.
Discrimination against women film directors is not a thing of the past. In French
speaking countries such as France. Belgium and Switzerland. women directors are
reported as representing only six per cent of the total number of directors (Lejeune.
1989). In Canada. a recent inquiry shows that, in the private sector, only sixteen per
cent of the directors of feature films are women. and 30.9 per cent of those for short and
medium films (Soucy. 1990: 43). At the National Film Board (NFB).• a Canadian federal
state agency where a large number of film directors acquire their experience, some of
them spending their whole career in that institution. women are still in the minority as
film directors. They represent 34 per cent of the continuing film directors (a secure
position) while they constitute 63 per cent of term directors (an insecure position). Only
22 per cent of the largest grants distributed in 1986-87 were awarded to women, while
all those under $20,000 were attributed to men directors. Yet. women's creations were
proportionately over-represented as recipients of awards: 25 per cent of GENIES
(Academy Canadian Cinema and television) ; 25 per cent of GEMINIS and 27 pel· cent of
GEMEAUX wenl to women's films. (Foundation of Toronto Women in Film and Video
(FWFV) 1990). So it seems that women receive some recognition from the professional
associations. Nonetheless, this does not seem to vest them with the authority necessary
to find funding. This is an interesting paradox which should be explored at greater
length. What makes women's knowledge recognized by juries awarding prizes and not by
juries granting funding? Politics of knowledge does not seem to translate into economics
of knowledge.

5. The NFB distributes
most government grants.
other money coming from
the private industry.

Why the discrepancy then? Why do women directors have so much difficulty in
gaining the necessary authority to obtain decent funding from the producers, including
the NFB? 1 suggest that the answer to these questions is twofold: dominant producers
seem to be unable to understand. and then to authorize. women's types of knowledge;
and, as a corollary. women's position in the power structure of the industry remains, in
spite of their relative successes, at the bottom of the hierarchy. These elements can be
observed in the relationship between film 'experts' (e .g. critics. producers,
administrators) and women directors' knowledge.

Feminine or feminist knowledge in cinema?
I have previously discussed different types of knowledge ari.s ing from the relationship
between the notions of objectivity and subjectivity used in the dominant discourse.
Using Code's conception of gendered knowledge. I have shown that dichotomous
categorizations of knowledge block our capacity to understand society. Knowledge forms
are continuous; we have to consider various types of knowledge. more or less objective
and more or less subjective. Further. pure objective knowledge is an ideal more than a
reality. as the knower always has to interpret the objective elements of knowledge
through his or her subjective characteristics. Yet, it is often in the name of that
knowledge that decisions are made, politics developed, funding allotted and film
criticism written by ·experts' in the film industry. Before I discuss the relationship
between male experts and female film-makers. 1 would like to examine briefly the
different types of knowledge that can be identified among films made by women.
A survey of some literature on women's film-making (e.g. Collectif 1990; Lamartine,
1985; Lejeune, 1989; Miller, 1988) suggests that. while there are generally some clear
distinctions between films made by men and by women, those created by women do not
altogether constitute an homogeneous category.0 Indeed. some films made by women are
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as distinctive from other women's films as from men's. At the same time, women's
creations entail some common characteristics. At a general level, the literature surveyed
suggests that women's knowledge as fllm directors Is about human conditions of people,
more often women's living conditions. while men's knowledge Is about the Human
Condition. Since women's films ' then take their distance from the great formalist
characters of popular cinema, they may be characterized as subjective as opposed to
men's objective products.
From that survey and based on this theoretical discussion , women's films. despite
their common characteristics, can be tentatively classified into four ideological streams
of crea~ivity: dominant stream , feminist stream, feminine stream and politicized stream.
It is important here to stress that although some female film directors may be identified
with one stream, others may fit into more than one, either because their knowledge has
evolved along with their creations, or because they happen to make different types of
movies. Despite this Important nuance, and because this article is primarily a
theoretical discussion on women's knowledge in the film industry based on secondary
sources, I describe only briefly the four categories. which are useful to understand the
discussion on the relationship between experts and women film -makers that follows. In
a study based on primary sources. it might be more appropriate to use the classification
on the movies rather than on the film directors . the four streams remaining the
same nonetheless.
The dominant stream is that of the female film directors who want to 'play in the
boys' team' (Lamartine, 1985: 144). THey use male knowledge, and do not question the
misogyny of the characters or the sexism of the stereotypes at the core of their creations.
The theme they exploit is supposed to reach a level of universality and objectivity that
transcends realJstic and empiricist qualifications. The feminist stream is at the opposite
end of the dominant stream: women's knowledge here intends to be militant. Lamartine
compares its effect to that of 'a bomb in the quiet garden of privileged males' (Lamartine,
1985: 139). Feminist knowers' movies are always disturbing because they throw
women's most important problems in the face of the viewers, clearly identifying the
culprit. The themes treated are life experiences specific to women. presented as a form
of knowledge that transcends the specificity of an issue and takes a universal character,
as objective knowledge, in order to gain authority in the world of dominant cinema. For
instance, they exploit the theme 'the personal is political' and present it as universal.
transforming what is considered as subjective knowledge in the dominant discourse into
objective truth.
The feminine stream consists also of women's knowledge about other women, but
without any preoccupation with political or militant intervention. This is a pro-women
cinema in which women's rolf'!S are Integrated as subjects. no matter the issue debated
in the film. Their knowledge is not about women's struggle, but about daily activities
that they know well, or that are more specifically concerned with women. These
creations, based on limited and well defined experiences. are identified in the dominant
discourse as subjective knowledge. Finally, the pol!Ucized stream consists of women's
knowledge that is not particularly related to women's issues. but rather to wider political
issues exploited from a woman's point of view. The films that fit here denounce
situations of political and economic oppression of people in their countries or their
particular ethnic or racial groups, giving important roles to women as well as to men.
But, instead of using wars and struggles over power among various social groups to
exploit the theme as men do, they show the daily struggles of ordinary people.

Struggling for authority more than for credit
We have seen that historians did not give much credit to women film directors in the
early period of the cinema industry, but that. since the early 1970s, some of them are
giving women their due for the work they have done. It seems. then. that the Jack of
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recognition of women In the film industry. with all the fin ancial and professional
struggles tbat it raises, would find Its origin at another level. 'Experts' have not given
women directors the necessary authority to gain the producers'7 assurance that it Is
worthwhile to find the money to make the fUm. Would tbis lack of authority reside in the
fact that women's work as film directors is pot Identified as objective, universal
knowledge capable of attracting a huge audience, but as s ubjective knowledge arousing
the Interest of a limited group of people?
Women's identification with subjective knowledge. despite the fact that some of them
have attracted a large popular audience. often comes from fllm critics influenced by
dominant discourse. and may have some echo a mong producers. But, critics give
women's knowledge more or less authority depending upon the ideological stream of
creativity to which their movies belong. This suggests that male domination upon filmmaking goes beyond technological and gender issues. The works reviewed for this paper
s h ow that women's film s that belong to the dominant s tream seem to attract some
positive appraisal from ma le critics. Thereby, their directors are vested with the
authority to create openings for funding. sometimes quite substantial. Works belonging
to the politicized stream seem to experience similar conditions. though at a more modest
level. as the funding generally comes from groups politically and socially involved in the
issues treated in the ftlms. The most problematic streams In relation to authority are the
feminine and feminist ideological streams. Film directors who belong to these experience
a complex situation in which some of their work gains credit from some professional
association s, and popular recognition, but not enough authority from experts from the
dominant ideology to attract serious funding.
Critics are usually rather h ard on these types of knowledge. Despite the awards they
have won at various festivals, they do not attract much praise particularly from male
critics. Maurice Bardeche. for instance. qualified movies representing the femin ine
stream as 'd'aimables ouvrages de dame' nady's nice needle-work). though these movies
exploit crucial feminin e them es of independence and liberation (Lamartine, 1985:70).
Luc Moullet writes in his critique of the feminist films made during the 1960s and
1970s: 'the anterior mediocrity of cinema can be explained by the fact that it was almost
exclusively the work of managing women with male domineering characters, who offered
only the fau lts inherent to their hybrid character' (Lamartine. 1985:80). 8 For these
critics. any theme that goes against male knowledge Is to be rejected. As it is, the same
critic s u ggested in his comments a bou t a ftlm prized a s one of the two best films at the
Festival du Cinema in Cannes in 1963, and made by the Ukrainian director Youlta
Solntseva. long after the death of her hus band with whom s he worked for several years.
thal she had won the award because s he was a 'real woman·. wife of a director who had
good influen ce on her. So women's creations are given credit by some male critics when
these can detect dominant knowledge in the products. Yet. Solntseva's prized film was
seen by an anonymous critic as a work of her own, almost a treason in relation to what
s he had done previously with her husband. Dovjenko.
Films directed by women are sometimes mistreated and misunderstood because the
knowledge they carry is different from dominant types of knowledge. This was lhe case.
for Instance, with Anne Claire Poirier's Mourir a The-Tete the theme of which was rape.
Altbough Poirier denied any feminist contention in lhe film. or any political assessmen t
and moral judgement on Man, some male critics saw It otherwise. Both critics in Le
Solei! (September 1979), a widely read newspaper in Quebec city, and in La Presse
(September 1979), a widely read newspaper in Montreal. said that it was clear that the
message of the film was that men were all rapists. Yet nothing in the movie could make
lhe viewer believe that the m essage intended to encompass mankind. Male critics
con structed their own interpretation of the film and presented it as general. universal
truth. In this case. it did not prevent tbe film from having a popular interna tiona l
success. But mistreatment of feminine films has b een widely appHed in domina n t
discourse and more often tban not it has been detrimental to their success. As Allee Guy
puts it. she who made hundreds of short and long films: 'There is no doubt in my mind
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that women's success In many domains Is a lways made very difficult because of a strong
prejudice against those of their sex who work where only men have worked during
centuries' (Lamartine, 1985: 46). 9 Some m al~ critics indirectly recognize that prejudice.
Commenting on a film directed by Mireille Dansereau, a woman director in Quebec,
Jean-Pierre Tadros says: · ... we leave [the theatre! somewhat s urprised. We expected a
vibrant feminist plea, we see Instead the description of a chaotic world, ... and feminine.
So much the worse for our prejudices; and so much the better for the film (1972).'
Prejudices against female film-makers come also from other experts . Women's
knowledge Is devalued by male producers and administrators in different ways. Some
ha~e s~ggested to women who attempted to become directors that they s h ould rather
become models or get married (Tadros, 1972). Others have advised them to make their
films In ways that would make people forget that they were women (Dussault. 1979).
Sometimes, however. women directo r s are supported by some of their m a le
counterparts, by technicians or by actors . This s upport is important for women directors
as producers often force them to associate with male directors to get funding. Although
~s type of discrimination Is not as crude as it was before the 1970s. women directors
realize that they can gel more money when they are associated with a man. even if he
has less experience than they do. This speaks directly to the politics associated with the
social hierarchy of knowledge: It clearly s hows that women 's knowledge is so low in that
hierarchy that. in the politics of distribution of funding, an experienced femal e director
is viewed as inferior to a new male film-maker.
As a result, women directors seem to have established niches in the world of filmmaking. Their highest representation is in the domains of shor t-length film s and
documentaries. Sine~ the greatest of recognition is to make a successful feature film. it
seems that there would be less competition from men in these two categories. Moreover ,
women ar e good at that kind of film. they often win professional awards. A well known
filmmaker in Quebec, Gilles Carle, stresses their innovative approach: 'The art of
documentary is experiencing a revolution ... this is women's doing' (1990: 101). From his
point of view. the documentary is the only domain of cinematographic change. Thanks
to women , cinema 'is experiencing some transformation'. Women's knowledge helps to
attenuate the boundary between fiction a nd documentary, h e says. By a curious
coincidence, he observes. civil servants in Canada have turned documentary Into a
minor genre, which means that they spare little funding for the films categorized in that
genre. As if to prove Carle right, NFB has lately cut its fin ancial s upport to the E (for
study) section , curiously that in which women were the most likely to find money.
To kill the documentary film is to kill the only cinematographic genre
that is now bringing a certa in reVival to the core of Quebecois
cinema. thanks to women's contribution, and this just when it is
experiencing spectacular success. It is also to deny our women filmmakers the possibility, not only of making a personal film from time
to time. but of purs uing a long term career' (Carle, 1990: 101).
Yet. women's work In the documentary genre is somewhat of a compulsory choice.
given the lack of money to make .feature films. Women often have to create their own
production companies In order to get the money they n eed and even then. they only get
s ma ll a mounts. So most of them are compelled either to go into the s hort film or
documentary, or to innovate in terms of technique. being constrained to fmd new ways
of making their feature films with very little money. Hence. we find some very successful
women in avant-garde cinema such as new wave cinema, or underground cinema.
whose talent is recognized by some experts. but these genres never gain the type of
authority vested In feature films dominated by men. But, do women want to h ave big
commercial successes. If It means that they have to dis miss important aspects of their
knowledge? It is not the purpose of this paper to answer this question.
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Conclusion
Women's knowledge in the cinema industry should not be considered as a collective
resistance to men's knowledge. My analysis shows that their contribution as film
directors Is cliverse and s hould be examined in its own right. Some are creating different
types of knowledge that have a definite Influence on the s pheres in which they work but
that are not usually recognized as such by the dominant discourse. But. are the
difference in types of knowledge the only reason sustain ing the lack of authority of
women film-makers in the ftlm industry?
Is women's knowledge th at d ifferent from that of men? It seems that whether
women's fllms are different from men's in technique and style is partly a result of the
level of funding. If women directors had access to the same levels of funding as men do,
they might treat their own themes in a different way. But this does not mean that they
would all do so. In their film -making, both women a nd men explore and speak from
their own experience. influenced by gender. but also by social class. race. age a nd
culture. as we have seen in the theoretical discussion. However, each sex seems to u se a
different style in this exploration. Scholars of film -making assert that men, in general.
use more violent. oppressive images, and women more nua nced and realistic.
Nevertheless, women directors claim to enjoy what they do. some of them say that they
are not interested in making large budget feature films. even if funding was available.
They take pleasure in their work despite numerous barriers that they meet in their
careers, arising from the mechanisms of power created by male ·experts' in the industry.
Indeed the m echanisms of power regulating the film industry are controlled by ma le
a dminis trators and experts who adopt the conservative dominant discourse of
rationalization In which women's knowledge is djsqualified, to use Code's words. The
type of knowledge valued as profitable by these men is male knowledge. based on so
called 'objective·. 'universal' truth, and supposed to attract mass audiences.'°Foucault's
assertion that mechanisms of power are to be found at different levels is verified In the
film industry where they are exercised at three levels: the administration of knowledge
as truth. a level that controls which films should be profitable; the politics of knowledge
created by male knowers that assess which types of knowledge should be authorized to
become public: and the relations of power created by a certain type of knowledge which
control who should have access to the first two levels. Women film-makers are not
significantly represented at any level of these mechanisms of power in the film industry.
Rather, they are those on whom power is exercised.
However. as we saw earlier. there is a noticeable gap between movies made by men
and women which is to be found also between films made by women from different
ideological streams. This means that women's place in the s pheres of administration
and production may not be the only important element in the existing mechanis ms of
power. My study questions women's solidarity with one another. The idea that women
are essentially humanistic and understanding. and t~at they would spontaneously
support other women's work should they find themselves In positions of power is
idealistic. Competition exists in female as in male circles. though it does not necessarily
take the same form. Since knowledge is as much influenced by gender as by class, race,
culture. etc, women with different ideologies and politics will not s pontaneously support
their respective work on the principle that they are made by women.
So. how then should we understand the discrimination agains t women film-makers?
Why Is it that they cannot gain authority in the film industry despite the recognition of
the quality of their work In various festivals? Is it because women's work is actually
gendered work? Women's cinematographic creations should be considered as part of th e
culture of a society. in the way men's are. It is the politics of knowledge that is gendered .
leading to discrimination in terms of vested authority and financial support.
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